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Abstract
Public concern about food safety is placing increasing pressure on government agencies to be
more prescriptive and proactive in their regulation of the food industry. However, given the scarcity
of public sector resources, concerns about the impact of regulation on competitiveness and the scale
of the task at hand, there is growing interest in co-regulation, with public and private sectors working hand-in-hand to deliver safer food at lower (regulatory) cost. This paper explores the scope for
the co-regulation of food safety in the UK and North America, where there are distinct diﬀerences in
the established regulatory processes. The authors conclude that opportunities clearly exist, to varying degrees in the diﬀerent countries analysed, but that considerable obstacles remain to the widespread adoption of co-regulatory practices in the area of food safety.
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Introduction
Increases in the recorded incidence of food-borne illness alongside the recent history
of high-proﬁle outbreaks that have been linked to food in a number of industrialised
countries have created both political and economic demands for more eﬀective food
safety controls. Consequently, government oversight of food safety has increased substantially in the last decade, including the introduction of ex ante direct regulations
and ex post indirect controls (Henson and Caswell, 1999). In addition, private mechanisms of food safety control have developed substantially and now play an important
role in the supply of higher quality, safer food. The result is an intricate and complex
network of both public and private incentives to implement enhanced food safety
controls.
The potential beneﬁts of co-regulation of food safety are self-evident; coercion can
breed minimalist approaches to compliance resulting in sub-optimal improvements to
public health alongside signiﬁcant expenditure of resources on enforcement and monitoring. Indeed, regulatory action often demonstrates rather high rates of non-compliance.
However, co-regulation remains a relatively new concept in most parts of the world. A
lack of trust among actors in the food chain and perceived risks associated with allowing
market forces to play a role in the regulation of food safety are factors that limit a closer
coordination of private and public resources in the control of food safety. Moreover, there
are signiﬁcant challenges in formulating food safety policies that reﬂect private and social
beneﬁts and costs; private and social interests are often distinct and an eﬃcient food safety
control system from a private business perspective may not yield socially eﬃcient
outcomes.
However, the realities of food safety responsibilities (and liabilities) from ‘farm to
table’ have brought about a new paradigm in stakeholder relationships characterised
by complex interactions between public and private modes of regulation (Fearne and
Garcia Martinez, 2004a,b). This shift of responsibilities towards the private sector has
created a more complex and demanding ‘policy space’ involving public and private sector incentives and controls (Garcia Martinez and Poole, 2004). Hence, the need to
understand the incentives for private actors to implement enhanced food safety controls
(Henson and Hooker, 2001; Hobbs et al., 2002) and, in this context, explore the opportunities for greater public–private coordination in the eﬀective and eﬃcient regulation of
food safety.
This paper explores the opportunities for co-regulation of food safety in the context of
diﬀerent institutional approaches in North America (USA and Canada) and Europe (UK).
It aims to contribute to the current debate on the role that government and industry might
have in providing for an eﬀective food safety control system, while ensuring that actors
along the food supply chain beneﬁt from the potential eﬃciency gains when the responsibility for protecting consumers from food-borne illnesses is shared between the public and
private sectors.
The paper is in seven parts: the next section explores the scope for co-regulation in the
area of food safety, with reference to the food safety literature, and the following sections
look speciﬁcally at the four key aspects of food safety regulation – setting standards, process implementation, enforcement and compliance monitoring. The paper concludes with
some thoughts on the role of co-regulation in food safety and the need for further
research.

Co-ordinated approach to food safety
For any given food safety problem, the level of public intervention may range from
doing nothing – leaving the market to ﬁnd the requisite solution – to direct regulation (Better Regulation Task Force, 2003). In-between, there is a wide range of options including
industry self-regulation, government provision of information, education campaigns and
labelling requirements (Fig. 1). While food safety has been the focal point of most regulatory programmes, the desire to protect consumers from fraud, encourage healthy and balanced diets and promote particular values (i.e., local food) has led to increasing government
involvement in the control of other food quality attributes’ (i.e., country of origin, organic,
PDOs, PGIs, GMOs). Determining consumer derived demand for quality from other
motivations for regulatory activity is an on-going challenge (Caswell and Joseph, 2006).
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Fig. 1. Options for public intervention. Source: own elaboration.

Although certain interest groups, for example those representing consumers, have concerns about more liberal approaches, there may be circumstances where there is a prima
facae case for governments not to intervene in food markets (Antle, 1995; Henson and
Caswell, 1999). A careful analysis of the beneﬁts and costs of alternative regulatory
options may advise policy-makers that there is no economic case to regulate in normal
market transactions, for example where costs of preventing an uncertain food safety hazard outweigh the probable beneﬁts. Moreover, there may be inequalities in the distribution
of costs and beneﬁts associated with regulatory action, for example increases in food prices
that have a disproportionate impact on low-income consumers and/or costs of compliance
that diminish the competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The difﬁculty and/or costs of enforcing new legislation can also persuade governments that regulation is not the best course of action.
At the other extreme, regulatory action is an appropriate response when food markets
fail to deliver the level of safety required to satisfy social public health goals. The nature of
the regulation can take diﬀerent forms, from prohibition, where certain actions, products
and/or processes are banned (e.g. the compulsory removal of the spinal chord from beef
and sheep carcases) to prescription, where procedures for dealing with a recognised problem are stipulated by the authorities (e.g. mandatory HACCP in food manufacturing).
Capture of the regulatory process by economic interest groups can also be a motivator
to regulate (Henson and Caswell, 1999).
Incentives for and the types of regulation required will vary depending on where a company is in the food chain and what products it you produces. Speciﬁcally, certain food sectors carry higher risks of food-borne illness than others (e.g. fresh meat versus canned
soups), so will attract greater regulatory attention. Similarly, the likelihood of detection
and the severity of the penalty provide downstream stakeholders in concentrated supply
chains (e.g. retailers) with a strong incentive to impose rigorous monitoring and detection
systems on upstream stakeholders (e.g. manufacturers and primary producers) which in
turn increases the probability of compliance relative to supply chains where there is less
concentration at the point of consumption and the probability of detection of non-compliance is lower (e.g. catering and food service).
Within the hierarchy of possible forms of public intervention, there remain a number of
possibilities to co-ordinate public and private actions and resources in the regulation of
food safety. The question is what form should this co-regulation take, and under what circumstances might private regulations and standards be the most eﬃcient and eﬀective
mechanisms to manage food safety either in combination with, or as an alternative to,
public regulation?
Co-regulation is an approach in which a mixture of instruments is brought to bear on a
speciﬁc problem, in this case management of food safety, typically involving both primary
legislation and self-regulation or, if not self-regulation, at least some form of direct participation of bodies representing stakeholders in the regulatory decision-making process (Eijlander, 2005). Co-regulation aims to combine the advantages of the predictability and
binding nature of legislation with the ﬂexibility of self-regulatory approaches. It thus
involves self-regulation and legislative action working together in a manner that mutually
reinforces one another.
An essential element of a co-regulatory approach to governance of food safety is cooperation between the public and private sectors in the process of creating new rules. This
cooperation in the ﬁeld of regulation may result in various forms of governance, such

as agreements, conventions and even regular legislation (Eijlander, 2005). Key to the coregulation debate is the distinction between private and public motives for the use of coregulation and the possible relationships between private and social beneﬁts and costs
emerging under a co-regulatory framework. In the ﬁeld of food safety economics, social
welfare analysis of policies focuses on the regulation of markets to increase social welfare
(i.e., improvements in public health) in situations where markets fail, while the political
economy (private) approach focuses on the position of interest groups in the process of
regulation (Fearne and Garcia Martinez, 2004a,b). An element in the political economy
perspective is the relationships between regulators and the regulated and the scope for regulatory capture, that is, the pursuit of the regulated businesses’ interests rather than those
of the public at large.
Policy-makers frequently argue that the primary responsibility for food safety lies with
the private sector, whereas the deﬁnition of basic standards, monitoring and policing is the
responsibility of the public sector. However, in an era of heightened concern for food
safety, both public and private regulations and activities are jointly instrumental to the
delivery of a safer food supply. Hence, the analysis of co-regulation of food safety presented in this paper focuses on four stages in the regulatory process where greater coordination of public and private eﬀorts may yield dividends in terms of the eﬃcacy and/or
economic eﬃciency of food safety controls: (i) setting food safety standards; (ii) process
implementation; (iii) enforcement; and (iv) monitoring. An analysis on how the three study
countries are approaching each of these stages aims to identify the level and nature of prevailing incentive structures and the regulatory context in which co-regulation of food
safety is more likely to succeed.
Regulatory standard-setting process
In recent years, governments have progressively employed risk assessment methodologies to provide standardised, science-based and ‘objective’ evaluations of speciﬁc risks.
This is followed by risk management decisions that seek to identify appropriate regulatory
interventions. Risk management involves careful analysis of the beneﬁts and costs of alternative regulatory interventions. This plays a similar role to risk assessment in disciplining
decision-making, providing empirical support for the regulatory options chosen and
enhancing transparency of the policy process (Caswell, 1998, 2004). While precise estimates of the economic beneﬁts and costs associated with alternative policy options can
rarely be made ex ante, systematic analysis of the technical and economic implications
of changes to the regulatory framework can reduce the probability of regulatory changes
that result in unforeseen technical problems associated with compliance and/or excessive
increases in the cost of production. In those instances where investment in a technical solution is required and/or the costs of compliance are not trivial, such analysis, routinely
undertaken as part of a Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) allows a degree of transparency in the regulation process, so policy-makers can make better decisions.
RIA for new or revised legislation or rules is a common feature in many industrialised
countries, including the UK and US. Further, existing legislation may be subject to periodic assessment through post-implementation reviews and policy evaluation, as in the case
of the UK. RIA is a point for co-regulation to enter as the government consults with interested parties in developing its analyses. In principle, RIA has the beneﬁt of facilitating
comparative analysis of policy options, informing the policy decision-making process

and enhancing transparency and accountability. However, a widespread perception within
the UK food processing sector is that RIAs are generally undertaken too late in the decision-making process to have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the promulgation of legislation,
while there are charges of inadequate consultation with industry over the scale and incidence of compliance costs (Fearne and Garcia Martinez, 2004a,b). This perceived lack
of consultation is of particular concern, as previous work has revealed little evidence of
the eﬀectiveness of RIAs in producing ‘better’ food safety legislation (Fearne and Garcia
Martinez, 2004a,b). At the same time, a perception of lack of consultation challenges the
very credibility of the RIA process.
Alongside mandatory food safety standards, governments can pursue co-regulation
through producing and/or stimulating the generation of voluntary codes of ‘good practice’. These codes set standards for the food sector and facilitate communication of information along the supply chain and to consumers. In the UK a plethora of private farm
assurance schemes has developed. These schemes typically incorporate, or at lest reference,
oﬃcial codes of practice and/or require their members to be aware of and to implement
these codes. In the UK, they cover over 85% of production in the milk, eggs, chicken, pork
and combinable crop sectors and over 65% for beef and lamb and horticultural produce
(Food Standards Agency, 2002).
Two examples in the UK, the Lion Quality Scheme and the ZAP Salmonella Monitoring Programme, illustrate how the progressive development of farm assurance schemes
towards stringent standards is seen as beneﬁcial in providing for enhanced levels of food
safety (Fearne and Garcia Martinez, 2005). However, this development is uneven across
sectors with the establishment of stringent food safety standards in concentrated and/or
integrated sectors (e.g. eggs, poultry and pigs), with retailer pressure also being a strong
inﬂuence in this process (Food Standards Agency, 2002). Moreover, the impact of retailer-driven assurance schemes on the level of food safety can often be much greater than
generic codes of practice developed by producer organisations or government agencies,
typically designed to bring compliance up to a minimum level. However, a potential problem with this approach is the promulgation of multiple (competing) private standards and
their impact on suppliers resulting from increases in (multiple) compliance costs. One solution to this problem is the development of industry standards, with which all buyers comply. Thus, for example, in the UK, supermarkets agreed to replace their individual food
safety audit processes by a single audit procedure accredited by the British Retail Consortium (BRC), which has reduced the food safety monitoring costs in supermarket supply
chains whilst maintaining food safety standards (Arﬁni and Mancini, 2003). Similarly,
the formation of the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) through the Food Business
Forum (CIES) and the development of a common private protocol on good agricultural
practices by the Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group (EUREPGAP) are further steps
towards harmonisation and mutual recognition of national and/or regional standards
amongst food retailers.
A contrasting picture emerges in the US where industry, consumer groups and other
interested parties are more actively involved in the promulgation of regulations. This is
reﬂected, for example, in the often substantial changes in regulations between the proposed and ﬁnal rule stages. This iterative process may be particularly important as a form
of co-regulation in areas where scientiﬁc knowledge and/or processing technologies are
changing rapidly. Critics of the system, however, argue that the US food industry is better

organised and resourced than consumer lobby groups and, thereby, has a greater inﬂuence
in the regulatory process.
In the US regulators are often presented with fully researched cost impact assessments
by the food industry. As a result, ﬁnal regulations may be better designed, complement
industry incentives more eﬀectively and have a better beneﬁt–cost proﬁle. However, the
risk is that proposed regulations become ‘watered down’ as some industry stakeholder
voices are heard more strongly than those of weaker groups, leaving aﬀordable public
health beneﬁts unachieved. Thereby, achieving an appropriate balance in this context is
a formidable challenge for policy decision-makers and for co-regulation.
In the US, the development of baseline food safety standards by the private sector is not
widespread and there is less co-regulatory interaction between private schemes and government regulations. The US presents examples where the lack of co-regulation has
resulted in duplication of eﬀort; an example is the voluntary organic certiﬁcation and
labelling programme for organic foods implemented in 2002. Prior to the establishment
of this scheme, about 50 organic certiﬁers operated nationwide. However, in developing
a national voluntary organic standard existing and established standards were not
adopted, rather the national standard was developed from ﬁrst principles. Partly as a
result, the voluntary organic certiﬁcation and labelling programme took 10 years to
develop.
Food safety standard-setting in Canada is the responsibility of Health Canada, which
must undertake an RIA under requirements for all federal government legislation. However, human and other resource limitations and the priority given to other activities within
the agency (most notably health care) suggest that fully researched RIAs are far from universal; in most instances these produce crude estimates over the scale and incidence of
likely compliance costs. Moreover, institutional structures for co-regulation through consultation and stakeholder input to the regulatory process are limited. Where consultation
does occur the mode is passive rather than active. This casts doubt over the transparency
of the decision-making process and the priorities considered during rule-making. At the
current time, however, there is increasing recognition of the weaknesses of the current regulatory system within Health Canada, and pressure for reform of regulatory processes
across the federal government from the External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation (2004). Thus, there is evidence of a shift towards greater stakeholder involvement and
more comprehensive cost–beneﬁt analysis.
Canada provides an interesting perspective of co-ordinated actions by the public and
private sector in the development of farm food safety programmes. The initial impetus
for the development and implementation of on-farm HACCP programs came from the
industry itself; a number of commodity organisations (especially for pork, chicken and
eggs) made eﬀorts to develop voluntary codes of good food safety practice in agricultural
production. In order to facilitate the more eﬀective and timely implementation of these
programmes, it was recognised that a more co-ordinated approach was needed. Thus,
the Canadian Federation of Agriculture implemented the Canadian On-Farm Food Safety
Program (COFFSP) with funding from Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC). Subsequently, a system of formal recognition of individual commodity programs by the CFIA
was implemented.
Further eﬀorts have been made in Canada at the provincial level to induce the development of farm assurance schemes. For example, in Ontario the industry and Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Aﬀairs (OMAFRA) are working together to

implement enhanced food safety controls in agricultural production through a staged process, moving from Good Agricultural Practice (GAP) to HACCP and from voluntary to
mandatory implementation. This staged implementation is not unusual in Canada, with a
similar process of implementation in the case of the Food Safety Enhancement Program
(FSEP); a HACCP-based scheme for the meat sector that started as a voluntary program
but became mandatory at the end of 2005.
Process implementation
There is also scope for co-regulation in both determining the ways in which regulatory
requirements are implemented and in the speciﬁc modes through which implementation is
induced and facilitated. The recent evolution of EU food safety legislation provides a good
example of this. Following the application of new EU food hygiene regulations from 1
January 2006, responsibility for the production of safe food lies more explicitly with food
business operators, a requirement that is already contained in current legislation and is
underpinned in General Food Law.1 All food business operators are required to have controls that demonstrate they are managing food safety within their business. This legislative
framework represents a shift from a prescriptive ‘command and control’ approach
towards an ‘enforced self-regulatory’ approach (Braithwaite, 1982), with the regulator
imposing a requirement on businesses to determine and implement their own internal rules
and procedures in order to fulﬁl the regulator’s policy objectives. The regulator is then
responsible for approving these internalised rules and monitoring compliance. Arguably,
the more risk-based and ﬂexible nature of these procedures is better matched to the needs
of individual businesses and to enforcement. They allow rapid adoption of new monitoring technologies by the industry (i.e., Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation Data – RFID) and
provide better opportunities for businesses to demonstrate that they have eﬀective risk
management systems in place2 and that their products present lower risk to consumers.
The three main EC Regulations3 that make up the package of new food hygiene standards are directly applicable, and therefore constitute the law, in each EU Member State.
National legislation is not required, or indeed allowed, to give eﬀect to these regulations,
beyond providing for their enforcement in national jurisdictions. However, there are a
number of areas in which these regulations either require or allow Member States to adopt
additional provisions as appropriate in their national law.
Some shift in focus of regulation is also visible in the US, from predominantly prescriptive process and product standard approaches to more ﬂexible and performance-based
standards that provide greater choices for businesses in the mode of implementation.
The Pathogen Reduction/Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (PR/HACCP) rule
requires meat plants to identify critical control points4 (CCPs), take responsibility for
implementation and control of their HACCP programs, maintain performance records
1

Regulation (EC) No. 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002.
Article 5 (1) of Regulation 852/2004 requires that the procedure or procedures be based upon Hazard Analysis
and Critical Control Points (HACCP) principles set out in Article 5(2). The wording of the Article gives ﬂexibility
in that it requires that the procedures be based on those principles. It does not necessarily constrain businesses to
implement a HACCP system, if this is not appropriate.
3
Regulation (EC) No. 852/2004 on the hygiene of foodstuﬀs Regulation (EC) No. 853/2004 laying down
speciﬁc hygiene rules for food of animal origin. Regulation (EC) No. 854/2004 laying down speciﬁc rules for the
organisation of oﬃcial controls on products of animal origin intended for human consumption.
4
CCP refers to any part of the production process where food safety is at risk.
2

and adopt plans for action should processes get out of control. The PR/HACCP rule stipulates that individual processing plants must complete a separate HACCP plan for each of
its manufacturing processes (e.g. raw beef not ground). A team of Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) process control inspectors enforces these regulations by determining
whether sanitation and process control systems are working to prevent adulteration. This
system, however, diﬀers signiﬁcantly from HACCP implementation in the seafood processing, which has been mandatory since 1997. In this latter case, inspection is relatively
infrequent such that enforcement is largely at the company level. Moreover, importers
have diﬀerent options for verifying that imported product was produced under HACCP
compliant conditions, including use of third party certiﬁers and reliance on assurances
from suppliers.
The predominant approach to the implementation of regulatory food safety requirements in Canada to date has been detailed process and/or product standards with enforcement through plant-level inspection. Until very recently, the implementation of HACCP in
the food processing sector has been voluntary, although in an example of co-regulation the
CFIA has operated an oﬃcial system of veriﬁcation and recognition through the FSEP.
The one exception, however, is ﬁsh and seafood processing for which HACCP has been
mandatory under the Quality Management Program (QMP) since 1992. As a result of
the relatively slow uptake of FSEP, however, implementation has recently been made
mandatory in all federally registered meat and poultry processing facilities. Extension of
this requirement to other commodities, for example milk and dairy products, is anticipated
in the future. Under FSEP, plants are required to implement a speciﬁed pre-requisite program but can develop a HACCP system tailored to their own plant and categories of product. The establishment’s management is responsible for verifying that the HACCP system
is operating eﬀectively, with CFIA inspectors auditing procedures and records. This represents a signiﬁcant change in the focus of food safety regulation in the meat and poultry
processing sector, with a shift of responsibility towards food businesses, but at the same
time ﬂexibility to implement a system of food safety control that reﬂects their own particular circumstances.
Perhaps counter to the shift towards mandatory HACCP at the federal level, the province of Ontario has recently promulgated and implemented a voluntary standard for
HACCP implementation aimed predominantly (although not exclusively) at the meat
and poultry processing sector. This standard, entitled ‘HACCP Advantage’, was developed in close collaboration with the food sector and allows for veriﬁcation and recognition
of the implementation HACCP and associated pre-requisite program through certiﬁcation
by the Standards Council of Canada. Interestingly, OMAFRA, which is responsible for
regulatory inspection of meat and poultry and dairy processing facilities, plays no role
in the recognition and veriﬁcation process. Since the development of this standard, the
main activities of OMAFRA related to HACCP Advantage have focused on promotion
of the voluntary standard, development of training materials and assessment of the costs
and beneﬁts of implementation.
The move across countries from a prescriptive towards an enforced self-regulatory
approach raises a number of concerns regarding the delivery of a socially optimum
level of food safety. Although the law may permit food processors, whether individually or collectively, to develop and implement their own food safety controls, this level
and form of self-regulation may not be acceptable to all stakeholders, particularly
consumers.

Enforcement
A key factor inﬂuencing the degree to which food safety regulations achieve their
desired aim is the rate of compliance among food businesses. Distinct inspection regimes
inﬂuence behaviour in diﬀerent ways. If the aim is to win the ‘‘hearts and minds’’ of food
business operators and their employees to encourage well-embedded and lasting changes
to practices, enforcement oﬃcers may concentrate on promoting good practice through
advice and education rather than enforcement action. This requires a set of prevailing
incentives to upgrade food safety controls over and above the potential enforcement
actions of regulatory oﬃcials. Conversely, the required speed of action and/or lack of prevailing incentives may require more stringent enforcement approaches, for example where
there are acute risks to human health. In extreme cases, this may take the form of forced
closure of processing facilities, seizure of products and/or prosecution (Food Standards
Agency, 2004).
Regardless of the mechanism of enforcement, it is evident that access to reliable information and advice is a vital component of any strategy aimed at achieving high rates of
compliance, especially among SMEs that may lack expertise and/or resources. Recent
studies by Yapp and Fairman (2004, 2006) on enforcement approaches for food safety
in SMEs shows that education activities by local authority had signiﬁcant eﬀects on
inspection rating scores and compliance levels.
In addition to advice, support and an eﬀective inspection regime, incentives need to be
in place to encourage compliance (Hampton, 2004). Regulatory incentives may take the
form of positive gains from the adoption of enhanced food safety controls, for example
through enhanced eﬃciency or ‘peace of mind’, and/or of negative consequences from
non-compliance in the form of sanctions such as ﬁnes or repercussions in the form of
declining market share and/or exclusion from markets. In general, incentives to comply
with regulatory food safety standards have focused on enhancing the costs of non-compliance, whether real or perceived, for example through warnings backed up by the threat of
action through the courts. A more positive (and potentially more eﬀective) strategy may be
to promote the potential gains from compliance through enhanced business performance,
a co-regulatory approach that has been largely overlooked.
The role of market-based reputational mechanisms as drivers for businesses to comply
with regulatory requirements can be signiﬁcant. Perhaps the most explicit use of this mechanism by regulators to ‘discipline’ ﬁrms is the posting of inspection results outside restaurants which has been shown to have a signiﬁcant impact on both customer patronage and
business performance (Jin and Leslie, 2003). This so-called ‘scores on doors’ approach can
have the greatest impact in the case of large retail or food service chains that have high
levels of brand capital to maintain (Boehnke and Graham, 2000). Reputational sanctions
may also be used through the publication of recall information and/or ‘naming and shaming’ ﬁrms that supply products that violate legal standards.
Finally, eﬀective penalties are an essential mechanism of last resort in the regulatory
system. They deter the most intransigent businesses from breaching regulations and provide assurance to compliant businesses that ﬁrms trying to gain competitive advantage
through non-compliance will be sanctioned (Hampton, 2004). Moreover, an eﬀective penalty regime can help to build consumer conﬁdence in the food supply chain (Cragg Ross
Dawson, 2005). For large ﬁrms, while the ﬁnancial penalties in terms of ﬁnes associated
with non-compliance may be trivial, the costs of bad publicity and/or product recalls

can act as powerful market incentives for compliance. These can take the form of both the
immediate costs of product withdrawal and disposal and, more signiﬁcantly, the longerterm loss of market share (Salin and Hooker, 2001; Wang et al., 2002). For smaller ﬁrms,
the ﬁnancial penalties associated with regulatory action alone can impose signiﬁcant economic costs and provide suﬃcient deterrence to non-compliance.
The UK has a compliance-based enforcement system with an emphasis on preventing
harm from occurring, as opposed to a deterrent-based strategy, achieved through a tiered
inspection regime. The work of enforcement oﬃcers is to encourage compliance by ﬁrst
promoting best practice among food business operators through education, training and
advice. However, if an oﬀence is detected, enforcement follows a hierarchy of progressively
more onerous action including an improvement notice, formal caution, closure of food
business, prosecution, and disqualiﬁcation.
Under UK law, although prosecution is considered an enforcement action of last resort,
non-compliance with food safety legislation is a criminal oﬀence with ﬁnancial penalties
depending on the level of infraction, imprisonment, or both. Major oﬀences can be elevated to a higher court where unlimited ﬁnes or imprisonment of two years can be levied,
although this is rare. However, enforcement oﬃcials have argued that, for certain types of
oﬀences, these penalties are too low to be an eﬀective deterrent,5 for example where large
quantities of unﬁt food are introduced into the food chain. In these cases, the enforcement
authorities may seek charges of conspiracy to defraud as a route to higher penalties,
although this is diﬃcult to prove and such cases are costly to pursue.
In the event of non-compliance with regulatory requirements, food businesses are
required to withdraw their products form the market and inform their local enforcement
authority. The FSA issues alerts to warn enforcement oﬃcials and consumers of acute
food safety problems associated with food products. In most cases food businesses recall
their products on a voluntary basis, again a form of co-regulation, although enforcement
oﬃcials are empowered to require a product to be withdrawn and/or seize products if
necessary.
In the US, food safety enforcement relies substantially on voluntary compliance, with
the exception of meat and poultry that are subject to continuous inspection by the FSIS.
For HACCP enforcement, FSIS examines recorded information and conducts scheduled
and unscheduled spot checks of plant procedures. If an inspector, together with a FSIS
compliance oﬃcer, determine that a plant is not properly performing tasks critical for safe
food, they can decide that the plant is out of compliance.
The low recorded rates of non-compliance with referral food safety regulations for meat
and poultry products may lead one to believe that FSIS secures compliance through the
exercise of strong enforcement powers. However, FSIS uses its enforcement powers rather
infrequently. If a plant has a chronic problem with sanitation or its HACCP system, an
inspector can temporarily close the contaminated equipment or responsible department.
Records for the period 1999–2001 indicate that FSIS issued an average of one closure penalty per 75 plants. Although a stronger action, plant closure by removal of inspection services, is possible, protracted court proceedings in the past have led FSIS to use this
enforcement tool on only very rare occasions. The high performance of sanitation and
HACCP systems in relation to the level of enforcement powers suggests that plants and
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their customers believe that these operations are important to business performance
(Ollinger and Ballenger, 2003).
In the case of an acute food safety problem, the FSIS requests but cannot mandate, a
supplier to recall its products and issues a press release. If the plant refuses to recall the
product, FSIS can seize it from the market and/or request an injunction from the courts.
This system operates on the premise that food businesses will act to prevent and/or manage the costs associated with oﬀending products.
Food safety regulations in Canada are enforced in a similar manner to the UK, through
traditional forms of inspection and enforcement action on the part of enforcement oﬃcials, with an escalating system including warnings, detentions, seizures, recalls and prosecutions. In 2003–2004, the CFIA pursued 68 prosecutions nationwide that resulted in 46
convictions with an average ﬁne of CAN$6565 (CFIA, 2004). Like the UK, therefore, the
penalties associated with prosecution are not the major incentive for compliance with regulatory requirements. The costs of negative publicity are undoubtedly the major factor
inducing food businesses that are regulated in the federal sphere towards compliance;
the CFIA issues a press release in the event of a successful prosecution and details are
made available on its website.
There is an on-going concern in Canada about rates of compliance among federally registered processing facilities. In 2003–2004, rates of compliance ranged from a high of
99.4% in the case of federally registered egg processing facilities to 78.2% in the case of
federally registered dairy processing facilities (CFIA, 2004). Indeed, the annual report
of the federal Auditor General in 2000 criticised the performance of the CFIA for the persistence of high rates of non-compliance. Among others, the report recommended the
implementation of risk-based inspection programs across federally registered processing
facilities. There are similar concerns about the eﬃcacy of existing traditional inspectionbased enforcement regimes in many provinces. For example, a recent inquiry into meat
inspection in Ontario recommended an entire overhaul of the existing system, with a shift
towards risk-based modes of inspection and enforcement (Haines, 2004).
In contrast to the meat and poultry sector of the US, the CFIA is empowered to require
the recall of food products that are considered in violation of regulatory requirements and
pose an acute risk to human health. In 2003–04, CFIA undertook 4462 investigations of
potential violations related to food safety, labelling, or fraud, resulting in 474 recalls
(CFIA, 2004). As a ﬁrst step, the CFIA requests that a food retailer, distributor, importer
or manufacturer issues a voluntary recall, and in the vast majority of cases this is suﬃcient.
Of the 2233 recalls co-ordinated by the CFIA over the period 1997–98 to 2003–04, only six
required a mandatory recall order (CFIA, 2004). This suggests both eﬀective coordination
between the CFIA and the food sector and that mandatory recalls impose much greater
costs on violators, particularly in terms of negative publicity. Details of recalls are routinely published on CFIAs website and there is a facility for the regular distribution of
recall notices by email to subscribers.
Monitoring of business performance
To maintain compliance with food safety regulations requires on-going monitoring and
evaluation of business performance. There is increasing recognition that inspections can be
an ineﬃcient and resource-intensive form of enforcement action, particularly in the case of
low and/or chronic food safety risk and businesses with consistently high rates of compli-

ance. Other mechanisms may be more eﬀective, for example provisions of advice aimed at
continual improvements in performance (Hampton, 2004).
There are co-regulation opportunities for government agencies to rely more on private
mechanisms of food safety control, including compliance with private codes of practice
and implementation of systems such as the new ISO 22000 series. For example, compliance with such norms may enable enforcement oﬃcials to distinguish between high and
low risk establishments and focus inspection eﬀorts accordingly. This relies on the trust
of enforcement oﬃcials in the eﬃcacy of private mechanisms to assess and maintain compliance with private norms and the degree to which these accord with legal food safety
requirements.
There are potentially signiﬁcant equity issues associated with the use of private standards and codes of practice as a means to allocate enforcement eﬀorts. On the one hand,
participation in farm assurance schemes, for example, is voluntary and non-participation
cannot be used as an indicator of low food safety standards relative to legal requirements.
On the other, participation in farm assurance schemes may be costly, acting to exclude certain operators, for example smaller farms. There is also a potential danger of ‘reverse capture’; the cooption of voluntary food safety standards and assurance schemes by
regulatory authorities.
As described above, private food safety assurance schemes are less well-developed in the
US and Canada than in the UK, although a number of producer organisations are currently promulgating commodity-speciﬁc farm-level food safety schemes. Currently there
is less scope for the use of such private mechanisms of food safety management as a means
to assess and monitor the risks associated with food operators and allocate enforcement
resources accordingly. However, with the implementation in Canada of oﬃcial mechanisms through which private standards are veriﬁed and recognised, farm-level food safety
schemes could become a means by which food safety performance is monitored by regulatory authorities. This is unique to Canada at least among the three countries studied
here. Likewise, the implementation of oﬃcial voluntary food safety standards, such as
HACCP Advantage in Ontario, could become a mechanism through which food safety
standards are assessed by regulatory authorities. Undoubtedly this will require a cultural
shift on the part of federal and provincial regulatory authorities but it is not inconceivable
in the medium term.
At the current time, regulatory authorities in Canada at both the federal and provincial
levels base their inspection eﬀorts on some form of risk assessment that involves the monitoring of on-going food safety standards relative to regulatory requirements. For example, while there is a minimum level of inspection required of all food premises, beyond
this level the frequency of inspection is based on an assessment of risk, predominantly
according to the outcome of the previous inspection. The progressive implementation of
HACCP across the food processing sector in Canada, most immediately in the meat
and poultry sectors, will undoubtedly contribute to this trend.
What role for co-regulation?
The challenge of food safety and the regulation thereof is a global one which has
attracted increased attention in recent years. Diﬀerent countries/regions have responded
in diﬀerent ways to the growing awareness of and concern about food safety. Those with
a strong export orientation (e.g. Australia, New Zealand, Canada) have had a strong

economic incentive to respond, for fear or losing export markets. Others have approached
the problem primarily from the perspective of domestic consumer protection. This paper
contains examples from the UK and the USA, where the focus has been on the latter and
Canada, where the threat of losing access to export markets has been a major driver of
regulatory approaches to food safety.
Co-ordination of public and private food safety management eﬀorts at diﬀerent stages
in the regulatory process can potentially result in improvements in the level of food safety
at lower cost and the more eﬀective allocation of scarce regulatory resources. Yet, as identiﬁed in this paper, co-regulation of food safety remains limited in practice across the three
study countries.
At the same time there are signs that co-regulation is becoming acknowledged as a valid
means through which food safety can be regulated more eﬀectively, driven by both regulatory change and/or the evolution of the structure and modus operandi of food supply
chains. Recent developments in the EU regulatory environment are providing a wider
range of opportunities for closer collaboration between regulatory agencies and the private sector in the management of food safety. In the US, the implementation of HACCP
across a number of key product sectors is shifting the responsibility for the monitoring of
food safety to business operators. In Canada, there are moves towards risk-based enforcement and monitoring as a means to enhance the eﬃcacy of enforcement eﬀorts at both the
federal and provincial levels.
Despite these trends, there are a number of potential barriers to the wide-scale adoption of co-regulation. Above all, the formulation of negotiated food safety policies that
pursue both private and social beneﬁts is a signiﬁcant challenge. There are very real
concerns about the potential for regulatory capture and a situation where regulators
place too much emphasis on the costs of regulation and not enough on regulatory beneﬁts for both consumers and food businesses. Another concern is that co-regulation
would further enhance existing inequities in the regulatory process. Consumer organisations may have concerns about a potential weakening of food safety regulations. This is
particularly an issue in the UK where there are prominent concerns about the ‘power’
of the major food manufacturers and retailers. Restricting such power was an important rationale for the establishment of the FSA. Although such concerns are not so
prominent in Canada, the role of the CFIA is certainly seen as regulating food businesses. Conversely, in the US regulation is seen more as the action of ‘last resort’ where
there is a clear rationale in terms of responding to market failure. Although this tends
to limit the regulatory powers of food safety authorities, it is also not conducive to coregulation.
The three countries studied exhibit varying degrees of stakeholder engagement in the
regulatory process. Although there is scope for capture of the regulatory process by dominant economic interests, such engagement can enhance the eﬃcacy and eﬃciency of regulatory measures by adapting requirements to industry and/or sector-speciﬁc
requirements. This can reduce compliance costs and facilitate implementation, enforcement and monitoring. The possibility of consulting the food industry is particularly important in the process of evaluating compliance costs and potential impacts on the
competitiveness of businesses at an early stage in the regulatory decision-making process.
However, this requires mutual trust and understanding on the part of government, industry and other stakeholders in order that ‘quality’ information is collected and assimilated
into the regulatory process.

Perhaps the greatest scope for co-regulation of food safety is in processes of enforcement and monitoring rather than the establishment of regulatory standards per se. There
may be scope for regulators to make use of private mechanism of food safety management,
for example private standards and codes of practice, as a mechanism to allocate scare
enforcement resources. However, this would require, a fundamental change in culture
on the part of enforcement oﬃcials, away from a ‘policing’ function in response to noncompliance and/or acute food safety problems (Yapp and Fairman, 2006) and towards
facilitation and encouragement. This is perhaps most prominent in the UK, where EU legislation is moving towards an enforced self-regulation approach, including wholesale
HACCP adoption. The challenge for such approaches is the economic and political fallout when wide-scale food safety failures occur. The real test of co-regulation approaches
to food safety regulation will be how to withstand the inevitable scrutiny when the next
‘food scare’’ occurs or a major outbreak of food-borne illness hits the headlines.
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